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The small loan business plays a vital part in the economic life of this coun-
try. Regulated small loan lenders in thirty-six states which have small loan stat-
utes make approximately ten million loans annually. These loans total approx-
imately three billion dollars.' Figures like these sound impressive, but just what
do they mean? To put it on a more down-to-earth basis or in a manner show-
ing the actual impact of the small loan industry upon the American economy,
these figures mean that one out of every five families borrows from a small
loan company or approximately one-fourth of the families in the United States
are indebted to licensed small loan lenders at any given moment. Also it has
often been said that eighty-five per cent of the people in the United States have
been involved with a small loan at some time during his or her life.
* LL.B. Columbia University; Member of the New York Bar.
1 The Federal Reserve Board has released the following figures on the small loan business in
its broadcast G 17.1, dated April 2, 1953:
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In April, 1953, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System revised its method
of compiling and reporting statistics relating to consumer credit. The following figures are
taken from their report G.21:
Loans Outstanding in Millions of Dollars
1952 1953 1954 1955
December 1,513.6 1,692.1 1,780.5
January 1,529.9 1,688.7 1,776.9
February 1,515.8 1,681.9 1,775.1
March 1,530.6 1,681.7 1,787.5
April 1,545.6 1,695.2 1,803.6
May 1,551.4 1,694.7 1,809.0
June 1,574.3 1,706.6 1,830.7
July 1,603.9 1,716.8 1,845.3
A "rule of thumb" which proves to be quite accurate for most purposes is that the volume
is approximately 180% of the outstandings. From these figures it can be seen that the small
loan business is quite important to the American economy.
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Small loan lenders require adequate credit information about the borrower
before they grant such loans. One of the means of obtaining this information
is through the medium of small loan lenders exchanges.
In many of the cities where there are several licensed lenders, there will
be found a small loan lenders exchange. The purpose of such a lenders ex-
change is to assemble, pool and exchange such credit information. Organized ex-
changes may be roughly divided into two broad classifications: one, the "open"
or unrestricted lenders exchange which acts as a clearing house of credit in-
formation and has no restrictions on the number of loans that a member may
make to an individual borrower. The second classification is that which is termed
the "closed" or restricted exchange. These exchanges not only act as a clearing
house of credit information, but also attempt to prevent the overloading of bor-
rowers by organizing to prevent the overextension of credit to borrowers through
the medium of limiting the number of small loans that its members may have
outstanding to a particular borrower at the same time. Up until the present
time a lenders exchange, be it open or closed, is normally a voluntary association
of lenders.
It has been alleged by some that where a closed small loan lenders exchange
exists that such an exchange violates the federal anti-trust statutes. Others have
alleged it is an end in the fulfillment and purposes of the applicable small
loan act. The scope of this paper is limited to a discussion of the anti-trust stat-
utes and closed small loan lenders exchanges.
The first question which naturally arises is whether an exchange and its
operations are within the ambit of the federal anti-trust statutes. It may be
argued that since an exchange is generally limited to a particular locality and
its operations are confined to the particular community that it does not fall
within the ambit. However, some exchanges, such as the one in Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania, extend their operations to the city of Camden, New Jersey, and
clearly this particular exchange is engaged "in commerce among the several
states."
The cases dealing with the question, that the lending of money may be a
business engaged in interstate commerce, are limited. In Watts v. Mann2 the
court implied that the lending of money was not interstate commerce, Counsel
had called to the court's attention the fact that a federal anti-trust indictment
had been returned alleging a conspiracy to fix rates of interest and made the
statement that it was their belief that such was not interstate commerce. The
court stated that they were inclined to go along with that belief. It should be
noted that no argument was presented on this point and that the court's opinion
on the point is dictum.
2 187 S.W.2d 917 (1945).
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In another case, United States v. Investors Diversified Services, Inc., 3 the
court had presented to it the question of whether a loan of money constituted
a commodity as that term is used in the Clayton Act, and the court stated:
"Although a loan of money might constitute commerce or may be
an article of commerce or may b7e subject to commerce under the Sher-
man Act in given situations, we are dealing here with the question of
whether money is a commodity under the Clayton Act." (Emphasis
added.)
Here again is another case which is obviously dictum. In the recent case, Mit-
chell v. Household Finance Corporation,4 the issue was whether the employees
of a small loan company were in "interstate commerce" for the purpose of the
Fair Labor Standards Act. 5 Judge Goodrich said, in reference to the question
of whether the company was engaged in interstate commerce:
"Preliminary to the three questions above stated is a broader one,
namely, whether the defendant's activities constitute 'commerce' as that
term is used in the Act. Defendant does not seriously contend that
the sum total of its business does not make up an interstate commerce
undertaking. We think that it dearly does constitute interstate busi-
ness and we think that the insurance case cited for so many other prop-
ositions in the course of the argument here is a general authority for
that position. See United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n.,
322 U.S. 533 (1944) . ..We were much pressed in argument with
the famous insurance case, United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters
Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944). That case held that the insurance busi-
ness was interstate commerce and its activities in connection therewith
came within the purview of the Sherman Act. We think that the most
that case tends to establish when applied to the set of facts before us
is that the small loan business, conducted as it is on a nationwide basis,
is interstate commerce. That was the assumption made at the beginning
of this opinion. The decision in the insurance case does not and can not
give us any instruction with regard to the coverage by the Fair Labor
Standards Act of individual employees of an insurance company such
as those engaged in soliciting insurance, settling claims, and the like.
It is simply outside the orbit of the question now before us."
An analogous field to the lending of money is the financing of automo-
biles. Automobile financing generally does not involve the making of loans but
the buying of commercial paper, and there are certain similar aspects. A great
many of the automobiles sold today are sold on a conditional sales contract.
These conditional sales contracts are purchased by commercial banks or finance
companies. The financing of automobiles in this manner has been held to be
"in interstate commerce" within the meaning of the Sherman Act in United
States v. General Motors Corporation.'
3 102 F.Supp. 645, 649 (1951).
4 208 F.2d 267 (1953).
5 52 STAT. 1060 (1938), 29 U.S.C. § 201 (1947).
6 26 F.Supp. 353, affd 121 F.2d 376, cert. denied 314 U.S. 618, rehearing denied 314 U.S.
710 (1939).
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Banking has been held to be engaged in interstate commerce, and for that
reason the bank was within the jurisdiction of the Fair Labor Standards Act
according to Lorenzetti v. American Trust Company.7 Banking has also been
considered to be interstate commerce for jurisdictional purposes under the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act. In National Labor Relations Board v. Northern Trust
Company,8 the court stated: "It cannot be said as a matter of law that no bank
can be engaged in such commerce."
The underwriting of insurance has been held to be interstate commerce in
the famous case of United States v. South-Eastern Underwriter's Association.9
Consent decrees have been entered against those engaged in financing on
the theory that they were engaged in interstate commerce and were violating
the Sherman Anti-Trust Act.' 0
It appears that small loan lending affects interstate commerce at least as
much as fire insurance. Proceeds of small loans will be used in purchasing
goods which are in the flow of interstate commerce. Further, many small loan
offices are parts of a national or regional organization which does commerce
among the several states and which has transactions crossing state lines. For an
activity to fall within the ambit of the Sherman Act it matters not that the ac-
tivity is primarily local in character, for if the activity is immediately, intimate-
ly and ultimately related to interstate commerce, then it is within the ambit of
federal anti-trust statutes. In United States v. General Motors" it was stated:
nor does it matter that the financing is considered to be,
local activity per se. For it is well settled that the federal government
may regulate under the Sherman-Act local commerce which is intimately
related to-interstate commerce or local activity which obstructs or bur-
dens interstate commerce ...
The pertinent section of the Sherman Actl2 is Section 1 which states in
part:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or other-
wise, or conspiracy, any restraint of trade or commerce among the Sev-
eral States, or with foreign nations is declared to be illegal. ."
It is against this language that the question must be determined.
In examining the various cases involving anti-trust violations and such
alleged violations it becomes quickly apparent that the fact situation in the par-
ticular case and industry determines whether there has been a violation of the
7 45 F.Supp. 128 (1942).
8 56 F.Supp. 335, 336, af/'d 148 F.2d 24 (1944).
9 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
10 United States v. Henry S. Morgan (D.C.N.Y. Civil Action 45-757, filed Oct. 30, 1947);
United States v. The Mortgage Conference of New York (D.C.N.Y. Civil Action 37-247, filed
Aug. 1946); United States v. Chicago Mortgage Bankers Assoc. (D.C. Y11, Civil Action 48c-
1826, filed Dec. 9, 1948).
11 26 F.Supp. 353, aff'd 121 F.2d 376, cert. denied 314 U.S. 618, rehearing denied 314 U.S.
710 (1939).
12 26 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1951).
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federal anti-trust laws. The Supreme Court in Standard Oil Co. v. United States' s
and United States v. American Tobacco Co.14 adopted the so-called "rule of
reason". 15 This rule means that before any practice will be declared violative
of the federal anti-trust laws, it must appear to the court that there is a restraint-
of-trade or commerce among the several states or with foreign nations and
that the restraint must be unreasonable. The Supreme Court has taken the posi-
tion that certain acts may result in some restraint-of-trade or commerce, but the
restraint is so slight that it is not unreasonable. In order to determine whether
a restraint, if any exists, is reasonable, one must examine the economic facts
of life of the particular industry. It therefore behooves us to look at some of
the basic facts of the small loan business.
The lending of small sums of money has many characteristics which are
unique and peculiar to the business. All small loans, with the exception of
those few states without a small loan statute, are made under and pursuant to
a particular statute of a sovereign state. These statutes all have what is com-
monly referred to as a rate section or, to be more accurate, rate sections. That
is to say, there are several sections which govern the rate of charge that a li-
censee under a particular state statute may charge a borrower of a small sum.
In the first place, all these statutes provide a ceiling on the amount of money
which a licensee may lend a borrower at the small loan rate. They all provide
a rate of charge sometimes referred to as "interest" and other times referred
to as "charges", which rates are over and above the general usury statute. Most
statutes provide that a borrower may not be directly or indirectly obligated to
a licensee for any amount in excess of the statutory ceiling (amount) at a rate
in excess of the general usury law. Loans which are made carrying a rate in ex-
cess of the statutory rate, when below the small loan ceiling, are generally
void and the lender has no right to collect any recompense whatsoever, and
when above the ceiling they are subject to the penalties of the general usury
law.
These statutes were enacted to remedy the loan shark evil. The small loan
statutes are of a remedial nature-they are not designed for general commercial
lending. States like Idaho, Nevada, and New Mexico have incorporated par-
ticular statutory declarations of legislative policy and findings of fact which
point out the evils existing in the particular state at which the small loan stat-
18 221 U.S. 106 (1911).
14 See note 13 supra.
16 It is not believed that the so-called "Per Se Violation" doctrine applies. There are none of
the elements present as where the per se doctrine is applied such as price fixing, division of
markets, etc. For cases applying the per se doctrine see: United States v. Trenton Porreries, 273.
U.S. 392 (1927) ; United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940) ; Keifer-Stewart
Co. v. J. E. Segrams-Sons, 340 U.S. 211 (1951). For a recent article with the thesis that pro-
hibitions should be interpreted by application of the dominant yardstick of the "rule of reason"
rather than by the "per se" doctrine see Oppenheim, Federal Anti-trust Legislation: Guideposts
to a Revised National Anti-trust Policy, 50 MICH. L. REV. 1139 (1952).
A recent decision of the Federal Trade Commission indicates that agency is coming back
to the "rule of reason". See In re Maico Co. (1953).
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ute is aimed. Other states like Florida, Maryland, and Tennessee have pream-
bles to their small loan statutes which in substance state the findings of fact
and statements of policy of the legislature in enacting their small loan statute.
The language used by the legislature shows dearly that the small loan statute
was designed to be remedial-to correct or to minimize an evil, to provide a
remedy.
The courts in some states which do not have a declaration of legislative
policy and findings of fact incorporated directly in the statute or in the pream-
ble have found the small loan act was a remedial measure.
16
That cooperation among the members of an industry to correct existing
evils in an industry is good is stated in William Filene's Sons. v. Fashion Origin-;
ators Glild.17 So long as the cooperative action is wholesome the courts have
approved such action when such facts have been shown and established. How-
ever, if the group action is designed to or availed of to create a single central
control, i.e., a monopoly whether by an individual or a group, such action has
been struck down.
The Supreme Court of the United States in Appalachian Coals v. United
States'8 stated:
"A co-operative enterprise, otherwise free from objection, which
carries with it no monopolistic menace is not to be condemned as an
undue restraint merely because it may effect a change in market con-
dition where the change would be in mitigation of recognized evils, and
would not impair, but rather foster fair competitive opportunities. Vol-
untary action to rescue and preserve these opportunities, and thus to
aid in relieving a depressed industry and in reviving commerce by plac-
ing competition upon a sounder basis may be more efficacious than an
attempt to provide remedies through legal processes. The fact that the
correction of abuses may tend to stabilize a business, or to produce fairer
price levels, does not mean that the abuses should go uncorrected or
that co-operative endeavor to correct them necessarily constitutes an un-
reasonable restraint of trade."
In spite of such clear principles the "free enterprise" claim is asserted by young
and vigorous groups who wish to avoid the restraints of public policy and
who wish to increase outstanding loan balances by second and third loans to
unwary borrowers.
No closed small loan lenders exchange has ever been known to use the
European cartel idea of dividing the business in any manner. There are no
known instances where a closed small loan lenders exchange has divided the
volume of business among its members. The grouping together of members of
16 See for example: Winneck v. Aentna Acceptance Co., 275 111. App. 438, 114 N.E. 166
(1934); Gash Service Co. v. Ward, 118 W.Va. 703, 192 S.E. 344 (1937); People v. Vander-
pool, 20 Cal. App. 2d 746, 128 P.2d 513 (1942); Domestic Finance Co. v. Williams, 174
Misc. 227, 20 N.Y.S.2d 467 (1940).
17 90 F.2d 556 (1937)_
18 288 U.S. 344 (1933).
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a particular industry to correct evils existing in the industry has been approved
by the courts in many instances. 19
The Supreme Court has said in Board of Trade of the City of Chicago v.
United States:
20
"The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such
as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or
whether, it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition. To de-
termine that question the court must ordinarly consider the facts pe-
culiar to the business to which the restraint was applied; its condition
before and after the restraint was imposed; the nature of the restraint,
and its effect, actual or probable. The history of the restraint; the evil
believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particular remedy, the
purpose or end to be attained, are all relevant facts. This is not because
good intention will save an otherwise objectionable regulation or the
reverse; but because knowledge of intent may help the court to interpret
facts and predict consequences."
The question resolved itself then as to whether a closed small loan lenders ex-
change imposes an unreasonable restraint of trade. A closed small loan lenders
exchange does not impose any unreasonable restraint upon any lender. The
small loan statutes provide that the borrower may pay off the loan at any
time and without the payment of interest contracted to be paid for the remain-
der of the term. Nor is any premium or penalty required for such prepayment.
This is a unique feature in small loan statutes. Generally, the borrower in the
commercial world must pay a price to pay off his loan before maturity or new
expenses in connection with another loan. Under the small loan statutes and
the rules of a closed small loan lenders exchange, if a borrower can make a bet-
ter deal with another lender, there is no restraint upon such a transaction. It is
rather a mere channeling of the business but not a restraint of the business. The
small loan statutes, as stated above, were designed as a remedial correction of an
abused credit situation within certain ceilings at extraordinary rates. The stat-
utes were designed as a shield to protect the necessitous borrower and not as
a sword to facilitate the exploitation of the borrower by a number of lenders.
The extraordinary rate was to meet a special or a particular situation, not a
series of situations for any borrower or a course of conduct for any borrower
among many small loan lenders.
In one sense the ceiling limitation, the maximum rate permitted, the stat-
utory limit as to the maximum length of a loan, such as twenty months, the
control of those contingently liable as endorsers or guarantors are each and
every one a restraint in and of themselves, but they are not restraints of trade.
They are the result of the use of police power exercised to protect and promote
the health, safety and welfare of needy borrowers.
19 See: Sugar Institute v. United States, 297 U.S. 533 (1936); Maple Flooring Mfgs. v.
United States, 268 U.S. 536 (1925); Cement Mfgrs. Ass'n. v. United States, 268 U.S. 588
(1925).
20 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
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We are familiar with examples of industrial action or the concerted ac-
tion of competitors which are technically restraints of trade, but which are
adapted for the health, safety and welfare of the public. These restraints, as
are all usury statutes, are similar in nature to the police action of the states in
adopting rules for the public health, safety and welfare. We recognize the need
for such police action and approve, provided the actions do not become unrea-
sonable. For example, merchants of a community may agree among themselves
to remain closed on certain days. This is quite common especially during the
summer months. It might be argued that such acts by the merchants are re-
straints of trade albeit on a local level; yet there are no cases known to the
author involving the prosecution of such merchants for such closings. Other
examples which readily come to mind are cases of those engaged in transpor-
tation; taxicab drivers who voluntarily agree not to carry more than certain
number of persons in their vehicles, which number is less than that permitted
by the authorities; or the case of the ethical drug concerns withholding a drug
from the market while they thoroughly test and retest the drug even though
laboratory tests indicate that it is safe, and that it would meet requirements
set down in the Federal Drug and Cosmetic Act or statutes of similar nature.
The public health, safety and welfare requires temperance and, there-
fore, such rules have usually been held to be good. Similarly, the health, safety
and welfare of the public requires temperance in credit in heavy loan charges
whether such loan charges by high interest rates or numerous activity charges.
Too many such loans will get the borrower into economic trouble. They will
destroy trade rather than promote it.
Where closed small loan lenders exchanges exist any borrower is free to
trade elsewhere among licensed lenders or other lawful lenders; and the lenders
are free to trade among the borrowers as the case may be and to "pay off" any
other lender in amounts within the small loan statutory limits. The statutory
limits for any particular borrower are fixed by the state legislature and not by
the closed small loan lenders exchange. The dosed small loan lenders exchange
is an aid in the fulfillment of state policy as expressed in the statute, the ad-
judications under the statute and the administrative rules and regulations.
New Jersey and Connecticut have regulations or practices which recognize
the need of such exchanges. The National Association of State Small Loan Sup-
ervisors has recognized the need by passing a resolution on November 7, 1952
as follows:
"RESOLVED, that the National Association of State Small Loan
Supervisors recommend the establishment and maintenance of an effec-
tive and efficient Lender's Exchange in each community composed of
all the small loan licensees in the said community."
Closed small loan lenders exchanges have received what might be termed
indirect "approval" of the federal grand jury that- investigated the small loan
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business and which resulted in United States v. Rufus DeWitt King,21 where
indictment under Section 1 of the Sherman Act charged thirteen high-rate
small loan company chains, twenty-seven other corporations and seventy-five
individuals with agreeing to fix interest rates on small loans in twenty-three
southern, southwestern, and western states. This is presumably the indictment
counsel referred to in the Watts case. At that time there was made available
to the Attorney General and the grand jury, the constitution and by-laws of every
exchange operating in the United States, most of which were closed small loan
lenders exchanges then. No action was taken against any closed small loan len-
ders exchange at that time. The facts were before the grand jury, and no in-
dictment was returned nor was any suggestion made that it had any doubts
about the closed small loan exchanges.
It should be noted that where a retail credit association was alleged to
have entered into a combination or conspiracy to monopolize the retail credit
reporting and credit information business by allotting exclusive territories to
be served by member agencies by boycotting, etc., and thereby eliminating com-
petition, a consent decree was entered in United States v. National Retail Credit
Association.22 In connection with this case, it might be pointed out that certain
discrimination in the membership of any exchange could be considered as viola-
tive of the anti-trust laws. For example, few will deny that a lenders exchange
can limit its membership to small loan licensees. This is so because the small
loan industry is classified as a separate and distinct business with its own stat-
utes and constitutional classifications approved by the courts, its particular prob-
lems and objects which are not common to all businesses. However, if the ex-
change refuses a licensee membership solely because it is alleged to be control-
led by a bank or other competitor, it would appear that such action would violate
the anti-trust laws as a conspiracy to eliminate or restrain competition under
the theory of the National Retail Credit Associations case.
A pending case, United States v. Cincinnati Fruit and Produce Credit As-
sociation,2 3 is also of interest. Here it is alleged that the members who control
eighty per cent of the distribution of fruit and produce in the Cincinnati area
refuse to sell except for cash to any customer who fails to pay his accounts
with any member within a prescribed time; customers disputing claims are ob-
ligated to submit to arbitration or be boycotted by all members unless they pay
cash at the time of the sale; uniform credit terms are enforced by a system of
fines on members who sell to black-listed buyers. The complaint seeks to pre-
vent the association from combining with its members to fix a credit period
or to force customers into compulsory arbitration of disputed claims.
21 U.S. Dist. Ct. of Texas, Crim. No. 13147 (1944), The Federal Anti-trust Laws and Cases
316.
22 Eastern Dist. Mo. Eq. No. 10420 (1933), The Federal Anti-trust Laws and Cases 165,
decree modf. (1953) 1953, 1953 Trade Cases 67,608.
23 Civil Action No. 2426, (1950), The Federal Anti-trust Laws and Cases 405.
DICKINSON LAW REVIEWV
Commenting on the case, Attorney General McGrath, the Attorney Gen-
eral at the time the case was instituted, said:
"Collusive action to fix terms of credit in sales transactions less-
ens competition. When sellers agree to black-list any boycott customers
in order to prevent any escape from credit terms uniformly imposed,
freedom of trade is curtailed, likewise by forcing customers to submit
to the arbitration of claims which they dispute. In this case, the De-
partment of Justice continues its program to prevent practices which
estroy the opportunity to negotiate, buy and sell from the domination
and control of a powerful group.
It would appear that if any exchange adopted rules, such as: (a) no credit
to a bankrupt borrower duly discharged until he picked up the unpaid balance
discharged in the bankruptcy proceedings; or, (b) no loan to a borrower by
another member within four months after making or obtaining a loan from a
member; or (c) no loan except on monthly installments; or (d) no loan to
be made below a given rate or term of any such additional restrictions, then
such exchange rule would be a violation of the anti-trust law. Such restraints
would use the small loan statute as a sword for the exploitation of the neces-
sitous borrower.
The closed small loan lenders exchange is a wholesome development on
the part of the regulated small loan industry which aids in carrying out the
objectives of the legislatures in passing the small loan statutes. The action of
the members of the industry in forming a closed lenders exchange to combat
the evil of overloading is sound judicially. See William Filene's Sons v. Fash-
ion Originators Guild.2'
24 William Filene's Sons v. Fashion Originators Guild, 90 F.2d 556 (1937).
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